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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact on staff of state-imposed public sector reforms alongside 
austerity cuts since 2010 in the emergency services of England. We discuss the contextual 
imperatives for change in the police, fire, and ambulance services while exploring their 
unique labour management and industrial relations’ structures and systems. As elsewhere, 
the burden of cuts and reforms has fallen on the workforce managed through skill mix 
changes. Such site-level management responses to austerity are being implemented despite 
staff concerns, increased dangers to the public, and their non-sustainable nature. 
 
Introduction 
It is now a commonplace of day-to-day work that managers acting on behalf of employers in 
both the public and private sectors are using the recession and attendant austerity 
measures in the UK to push back the frontier of control (Goodrich 1920) and reduce 
workers’ and union rights and abilities to mobilise against wage cuts and deteriorating terms 
and conditions of service (CLASS 2015). This is all part of the small state aspirations of 
Conservative government policy (Krugman 2015).   This study examines some of those 
sectors with high union membership, strong formal industrial relations traditions, high 
public profiles, and which are part and parcel of the daily expectations of citizens being 
protected by the state from harm. The three emergency services (fire, police, ambulance) 
come into our lives when there is a crisis, protect us all from harm, and are now 
experiencing the same kind of labour management pressures found elsewhere in the 
economy (OBR 2015). The government’s austerity policies have speeded up and enlarged 
those trends in emergency services management that were apparent before 2008, but only 
in a piecemeal and limited way.  
Work is organised in ways that are supposed to ensure that those at work are set tasks to 
achieve in a controlled and orderly fashion explicitly linked to the service being provided to 
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a given set of customer-users and within the context of the pro tem business priorities. This 
division of labour and skill mix is designed to maximise productivity and minimise labour 
costs within an efficient firm. Classical and neo-classical economists concern themselves 
with both the level of wages in exchange for labour and the use-value of that labour when 
managed to perform set tasks (Hicks 1932). This general position gives rise to the ceaseless 
set of workplace conflicts between managers acting on behalf of the employer and workers 
(individually and collectively through their trade unions) seeking to defend and improve 
their pay and conditions of service (Kelly 1999), including the use to which the employer 
puts their skills. This struggle over job regulation is part of the wider class struggle to 
recognise the nature of exploitation and the efforts to hide it from workers (Hyman 1989).  
The argument is summed up, ‘as the division of labour increases, labour is simplified’ (Marx 
1849: 225). This becomes the basis for two subsequent debates rooted in an increasingly 
instrumental view taken by workers of their work (Goldthorpe et al 1968), namely that they 
work for wages and that is that (Marx 1859: 210). As labour diminishes into ever smaller skill 
differences (however much exaggerated) the advent of ‘generalised labour’ creates a labour 
market ever more flexible and mobile to suit all occasions (Marx and Engels 1846: 87). As 
Cohen summarises, ‘capitalism increases the number of distinct jobs involved in the 
production of a given product, but at the same time it decreases the specialization of the 
worker’ (1988:194). This lays the basis for both Braverman’s general deskilling thesis (1974), 
and Polanyi’s (1944) interpretation of Gramsci’s works (1929-35) about the socialised nature 
of the division of labour and its attendant consequences for the creation of a working class 
as a class (Burawoy 2003). This includes, though frequently in a contentious manner, 
workers in uniforms especially as the office holders are state employees with a distinctive 
employment status. 
Under these long-term tendencies for the development of a generalised labour problem 
senior managers devise a range of solutions for controlling worker performance within the 
twin pressures of internally set budgets and externally created demand for the service 
(Marginson 1993). In the public sector all of this applies and at times of austerity becomes 
both the dominant and determinant pressure generated from the neo-liberal policy 
programme (Krugman  2015). In the case of the three emergency services in England their 
budgets have been cut in real terms (ONS 2015), and subsequently staff pay and pensions 
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(Hutton 2011) have been reduced nationally by unilateral government decision. Yet, given 
the nature of the ‘blue light’ services provided, levels of service delivery and performance 
have to be seen to be maintained. The only way to try to square this circle is through 
changes to skill mix and division of labour. The three services, for reasons that we hope to 
explain, have reacted differently (Seifert and Mather 2013). 
The police service has externalised the problem through the creation of a lower skilled 
group of workers, Police and Community Support Officers (PCSOs) who are employed as 
civilians doing some tasks previously performed by warranted police officers (so-called 
‘civilianisation’, Merritt 2010). In the ambulance service the new division of labour has been 
internalised through the split of grades into a new paramedic job with higher pay and 
professional aspirations and technicians with lower pay and less skilled task requirements. 
This parallels developments elsewhere in the health services with changes in skill definitions 
of nurses (Grimshaw 1999), and health care assistants (Bach et al 2008). All ambulance staff 
remain employed by NHS Ambulance Trusts. This change is separate from but concerned 
with the increased privatisation of some non-emergency ambulance services. Third, the fire 
service has kept the job the same. That is, fire fighters remain a single grade with general 
and specific skills and tasks and there has been no further division of labour. This paper 
draws on research findings from a larger study to examine this triptych of management 
responses to the twin pressures of budget cuts and the need to provide these blue light 
services. It provides an interesting story in terms of the three services and the staff and 
union experiences of these developments. We begin with a discussion of the contextual 
imperatives for change in these services and their unique industrial relations arrangements 
before moving to our research findings and concluding remarks. 
The political economy of emergency services 
There is increasing state-sponsored downward pressure on costs across all UK public 
services since 2010 including fire, police and ambulance i. This example of really existing 
austerity is a graphic reassertion of neoliberal market strategies wrapped up in the rhetoric 
of small state and big society (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012), and presented as achieving 
‘more for less’ with little democratic accountability (Chomsky 1999). 
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Austerity measures are then legitimised under the auspices of increased and ultra-
democratic localism (Seifert 2014). The effect is to bypass locally elected representatives of 
citizen users   thereby skewing services  towards those citizens with the loudest voices and 
deepest pockets.   For example, the move towards directly elected USA-style Police and 
Crime Commissioners is now complete (Jones et al 2012), and as local government is 
degraded so the political vacuum is filled either by more central government intervention 
(pace fire fighters’ pensions) or by unaccountable self-serving senior managers (Francis 
2013). 
 
This attack on public sector employment was predicted by Hood in the 1990s as New Public 
Management (NPM) overtook progressive public administration as the hallmark of the 
reforming movement within the public services (Hood 1995). As Bach and Kessler observe, 
‘in the public services the connection between employee relations policies and practices, 
worker attitudes and behaviours, and organisational outcomes clearly assumes a very 
different form [from that in the private sector]’ (2012:2). They note the potentially 
disastrous outcomes that flow from problems of low morale, poor employee relations, and 
inappropriate skill mix/workforce organisation decisions in public services. This is echoed in 
local government, ‘empirical findings show councillor, union and worker resistance to 
managerial reform. They also show job loss, work intensification, job insecurity and 
demoralisation of staff’ (Gill-Mclure 2014, p.365). 
UK public services are labour intensive and function within non-market profitless 
organisations. That is the key feature that distinguishes this work from work in the private 
profit-making sectors.  Public sector service managers, therefore, must seek out ways of 
intensifying and extensifying work as part of the process of ‘managing’ the increasingly 
fraught labour problem (Burchell et al 2005).  As a result there have been widespread job 
losses across these services – 5600 police officers; 4000 fire fighters; and 2000 ambulance 
paramedics. Senior managers, therefore, have to find ways of doing the same (or more) 
with less and they must find ways of being seen to protect ‘front line provision’ in order to 
reassure the citizen-user that service standards are maintained. This is because there is also 
a close relationship between service users and front line employees such that ‘the 
performance of these employees will determine the efficiency and effectiveness of service 
5 
 
delivery’ (Bach and Kessler 2012:2). This link further illustrates the special case of state 
employees and is acutely felt in the emergency services.  
If there is an emergency then workers expect to be called out. This is reflected in the 
overarching responsibility assumed by the state for such provision, and of longstanding 
views on how best to regulate work and wages in these monopsonistic services. There are 
culturally-inspired state-supported images of brave ‘heroes’ protecting us all from harm 
which lend themselves to quasi-militaristic ways of organising these uniformed services, 
particularly police and fire, along command and control lines.  
Our study of labour management decisions on the emergency service ‘front line’ suggests 
that different management ‘solutions’ to coping in times of austerity emerge and that these 
are best understood using the analytical device of labour process theory (Braverman, 1974). 
However, division of labour /skill mix decisions outcomes will vary dependent on specific 
management strategies, organized worker power, and workforce disposition (Vidal, 2007). 
This general proposition is accentuated in the case of ‘blue light’ emergency service work 
which is characterised by extremes of danger to staff and/or citizens’ lives. The work of 
emergency medical teams is ‘uncertain, unpredictable, urgent, complex, interdependent, 
and tightly coupled’ (Klein et al 2006:590/1). Similarly, the work of ambulance crews 
involves ‘constant emotional oscillations’ as they face potential life and death situations 
every time they receive a 999 call (Boyle and Healy 2003:351). Firefighters are more likely to 
suffer stress and stress-related injuries in their day to day work (Steffen et al 2012). One 
result is ‘that injury often occurs when protective gear is not used properly …because of 
haste, cumbersome gear can sometimes interfere with performance, and cultural factors’ 
(Kahn et al 2014). Research into police work concluded that ‘ police officers face a number 
of challenges in their working lives that were felt more acutely by them … police officers 
were also less likely than the other(s) … to feel like they have control over when they work 
their hours … (and) police officers were found to be consistently less likely to feel consulted, 
fairly treated or to trust their managers … Lack of trust, in particular, stands out as a serious 
problem for police officers across all ranks and jurisdictions’ (Jakubauskas and Wright 
2012:4).  
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In all of this there is a false but widespread split as between the frontline (brave and 
protected) and backroom (bureaucratic and a burden). Even self-ascribed definitions of 
where the frontline begins and ends are variable and contradictory (O’Connor 2011). The 
‘split’ does raise, however, the question of task allocation, skill-mix hierarchies, and labour 
management ways of solving the long-standing labour problem (Kaufman 1993). The 
fundamentals of which are rooted in deep-seated feelings of being exploited (not valued), 
being alienated (not in control with military-style command structures) and increasing levels 
of anomie (clash of culture and values). The popularity of the jobs under consideration (no 
recruitment problems), and  the extent to which being in uniform, respected, part of teams, 
and with a high-profile of dedicated professionalism affects levels of worker discontent and 
associated collective action remain elements of the labour management conundrum (Knight 
2013). 
Industrial relations and the new division of labour 
All three staff sets are highly organised: fire fighters in the FBU; ambulance staff in UNISON, 
UNITE, and the GMB; police civilians in UNISON and the PCS in London; and police in the 
PFEW ii . All groups function within a national collective bargaining forum mediated by 
specific institutional variations.  Fire fighters’ pay was indexed to the upper quartile of male 
manual workers as part of the settlement of the 1977 strike, but ended after the 2002-4 
dispute (Seifert and Sibley 2011).  The system has reverted to a Whitley-style National Joint 
Council (Grey Book) and is under the zero-pay policy.  
Ambulance staff come under the NHS Pay Review Body following on from the Agenda for 
Change Job Evaluation exercise in which they were up-rated from old manual grades to a 
mix of old APT&C grades, with paramedics and technicians emerging into the daylight from 
the previous skill mix muddle.  This resulted in considerable pay uplift for paramedics. Even 
though ambulance staff are under the 2010 pay-freeze, the main issues are pensions, 
conditions of service (especially with regard to workload) and management attacks on trade 
union rights. 
Since 1919 the police have been unable to strike and so do not enjoy free collective 
bargaining, although they all belong to a post-entry closed shop federation.  Nationally, pay 
is decided in an indexation format through the PNB (Hunter 2003, Winsor 2011), which 
7 
 
morphed into a form of Pay Review in 2014. Locally, the PFEW is active in representation 
and bargaining with Chief Constables along horizontal lines (constables, sergeants, and 
inspectors) with some joint board activity.  PCSOs are employed on local authority pay and 
conditions and have the right to strike.  
Fire fighters in England are involved in a long-running dispute that has included strike action 
over changes to their pension arrangementsiii. The police marched (in 2013) against their 
pay settlement, and PCSOs have been involved in general local government strikes over 
payiv. The ambulance staff have been in dispute with their employers over work load, 
privatisation, and pay v. Thus cuts and the management recreation of the division of labour 
are located within a generally hostile industrial relations’ setting. 
In the context of austerity measures there is a need to push down on unit labour costs as 
the only viable way to make savings and maintain standards. The emphasis will be on how 
managers pass on the cuts. One aspect of this is an intensification of current trends around 
task reallocation rooted in Taylor’s nostrums as explained by Braverman, and concerned 
with decisions about division of labour ‘which add to the productivity of labor’ (Babbage in 
Braverman 1974:55).  
Braverman’s analysis of the division of labour underlines the centrality of decisions about 
task allocation to an understanding of the labour processes of any occupation. While task 
reallocation may deliver cost savings the conundrum for managers is to cut costs while 
responding positively to the political and service imperative to protect the emergency 
service front line. Division of labour and task allocation decisions therefore need to marry 
the twin concerns of cost cutting and service standards. This means some engagement with 
the nature of the tasks involved and level of skill required to perform the task so that citizen 
users are reassured. For the workers this may spill over into more collective bargaining 
leverage and the ability to resist imposed changes. The relationship between skill and what 
this infers about competence to do the job is equally problematic. Gallie (1994) uses a range 
of measures for determining the skill embodied in work such as length of training and time 
taken to learn to do the work well. But training and qualification do not in themselves 
provide a clear indication of role content or competence to undertake different tasks 
(Neyroud 2011). Our point is that division of labour and task allocation decisions are not 
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about improving competence and service per se, but rather, they provide opportunities for 
cost savings as ‘separating simple from complex tasks permits economies in training and 
recruitment’ (Rueschemeyer 1986:18).  
These debates require special attention when applied to emergency service workers 
because public service professionals, ‘as holders of specialist expertise, expect to exercise a 
degree of autonomy over their work and their work processes’ (Ferlie et al 1996:168). In the 
case of emergency service workers the degree of autonomy is often confined to professional 
decisions in immediate situations and within a group-based decision making mechanism.  
Autonomy is also circumscribed by the scrutiny of external observers. 
Conceptualised in this way, skill and competence in these services is bound up with training, 
the materials and knowledge to do the job, tacit know-how based on experience and some 
control over the immediate work situation. The team analogy is to some extent related to 
the military-style command hierarchies, the heroic nature of the labour process and a 
shared ‘special’ function that saves lives, prevents crimes, and deals with injuries and illness.  
One feature of division of labour decisions in the public sector has been the use of cheaper, 
‘assistant’  roles ‘including the expansion of community-support officers in the police service 
and a variety of assistant roles established in health and social care’ (Bach et al 2006:2). 
Such analysis highlights the ways in which new job boundaries and attendant task allocation 
decisions are intertwined with broader debates about ‘eligibility rules’,  who may be 
employed in a category, how many, training requirements, and ‘performance rules’, defining 
the tasks undertaken and the ways in which they are performed. More recent studies 
include new division of labour arrangements  in the UK probation service (Gale 2012), in the 
English Further Education sector (Mather and Seifert 2014), and in nursing (Bach et al 2012). 
All highlight a tendency for service managers to reallocate tasks where possible to carefully 
delineated groups of workers with differentiated job roles and on different levels of pay.  
Methods  
The focus of the fieldwork was to reveal the experiences of emergency service front line 
workers and their union representatives (FBU, PFEW, GMB and UNISON) to managerial 
efforts to reform skill-mix arrangements. The design of the larger research project, although 
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essentially mixed-method in its approach at discrete stages, is rooted in qualitative 
traditions that allows for access to the ‘multi-layered and textured social world… based on 
methods of analysis, explanation and argument building which involve understandings of 
complexity, detail and context’ (Mason 2009:3).  
The research project involved participants from across England and  included twenty seven 
in-depth interviews, six discussion groups with representatives, and meetings with ten key 
informants from each emergency service. Data were also drawn from secondary sources 
including government, service and union websites/blogs and documents. The particular 
focus of this paper emerged from interviews with national and regional  (Sergeants’ and 
Constables’ Branch Board representatives ) PFEW representatives (excluding Metropolitan 
Police), FBU regional and branch officials, UNISON and GMB regional and branch officials 
representing ambulance staff. The interviews were based on semi-structured questions 
about  the nature of the service, the nature and understanding of what constituted front 
line work, views on spending cuts, skills mix and division of labour, current workplace issues 
and union responses. Within this general framework each interview unfolded in different 
ways, with interviewees providing detailed commentaries around core labour management 
matters as they saw them. The data therefore provided a rich and detailed insight into 
aspects of work in these services. Each interview, discussion and meeting lasted for 
approximately one and a half hours.  
Findings 
Externalising jobs in the police: 
Successive governments have long been concerned with the costs of maintaining a police 
force. This has meant control over pay costs, changes in conditions of service including 
pensions and hours worked, more powers to senior managers, and a cheapening of 
provision through outsourcing and skill mix changes. In 2002 the Police Reform Act 
introduced PCSOs as cheaper labour to replace the work of the more expensive and less 
tractable police officer. The political imperative rested on having ‘bobbies on the beat’ 
irrespective of actual police effectiveness. This was delivered at least-cost under the 
auspices of ‘Neighbourhood policing’ which is ‘the presence of visible, accessible and locally 
known figures in neighbourhoods(Turley et al 2012: 2).  By 2014, with cutbacks and 
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increased pressures on the service, the role of PSCOs was less clear cut as there had been 
some blurring of the boundaries with the office of constable. A plea to save PSCOs from cuts 
argued: ‘PCSOs should not be viewed as expendable in times of austerity. They have a vital 
role in neighbourhood policing, which is in turn important for police legitimacy. This in fact 
makes them crucial to police forces trying to save money (O’Neill 2014: 265). 
Police officers were less enthusiastic about the benefits of PCSOs. Key themes that emerged 
through much of the interview and meetings data were uncertainty and feeling let down 
(‘betrayed’) by government policy. An important aspect of this betrayal related to the 
introduction of PCSOs which, they felt, sometimes had the effect of undermining ‘the police 
job’.  While PFEW representatives noted the importance of the PCSO role they remained 
sceptical about its contribution to the police ‘family’. Some expressed the view that urban 
policing in particular did not lend itself to this division of labour decision so as one put it, 
‘PCSOs tend to be used more outside the big cities … the experiment isn’t sustainable’. 
Another noted the limitations in that ‘off duty police officers come in during a crisis, but 
CSOs don’t volunteer. They’re not part of the police family’. If there is an incident police 
constables usually stay at work whereas PCSOs ‘are straight out of the door at the end of 
their shift. They increase our workload because they don’t deal properly with incidents and 
they are the first port of call’.  
The PFEW representatives suggested that this division of labour is a false economy. More 
fundamentally it appeared to be the opinion among police sergeants in particular that 
reliance on PCSOs in the neighbourhood effectively severed or severely weakened the links 
between the community and their police officers. They were disparaging about the role, 
suggesting that they should be ‘given more power, or got rid of altogether’.  
There was also a view that as budgetary pressures continue then service managers will 
inevitably pursue further workforce and task allocation changes – shorter shifts (to avoid 
overtime payments); curbs on 24/7 availability; narrowing down police activity from ‘nice to 
have’ to ‘essential to have’. Police officers reported that ‘you have to cover yourself in case’. 
A senior figure noted that ‘it is better to have fewer, better people than more who are no 
good’. This comment suggests the PCSO role is undervalued, although this division of labour 
was seen as politically expedient as a means for ‘simply being visible on the streets’ at 
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lowest possible cost. Others were critical of the focus of the sustained budget cuts, 
commenting that ‘cuts should start with the senior managers … the front line must be 
saved’. Underpinning this were deeper concerns about the ramifications of job cuts for the 
age profile and loss of senior (older) staff who have ‘trodden the beat’. Implied within this is 
the relative importance of tacit skill and job know-how that is assimilated over time within 
the labour process. 
Interviewees also reported pressure to move to one officer on the beat rather than two and 
they also raised questions over access to training. PFEW representatives were particularly 
critical of this development, suggesting that police resourcing needed to relate to the role 
and function of the job – and for the most part there was a need for two officers. As one 
commented, ‘they (government ministers) simply don’t understand the nature of frontline 
policing’. The official line on service websites is an increased emphasis on training and 
career progression, but this, according to the PFEW is for the smaller number of warranted 
officers.  
According to government websites the priority policing areas are sex offences, organised 
crime and neighbourhood policing. While interviewees did not disagree with these broad 
commitments, they felt that such definitions further blurred the front-line/backroom split 
that drives managerial (and political rhetoric) about a new, more efficient division of labour 
that protects the front line while cutting the backroom. As one PFEW representative 
explained, ‘being on the street stops crime and disorder, but looking for a sex offender is 
not front line is it?’ Similarly, another noted the importance of ‘the presence of the bobby 
on the beat …cops that can be trusted…. But this tradition is changing and really, proper 
neighbourhood policing is being lost’.  
Underlying all of this are the twin pressures of balancing the needs of the public and the 
workload of the police officers. The organisation and deployment of staff is therefore 
crucially important both through skill mix arrangements and through shift working and 
rosters. PCSOs are argued by service managers to provide the requisite flexibility but this is 
contested by police officers. One PFEW regional representative emphasised that ‘PCSOs are 
not flexible but we are’. Nevertheless, revised recruitment and selection strategies for the 
service highlight that entry routes into the police service have been changed, with graduate 
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entry now posited as the way to revitalise policing. This move continues to be resisted by 
the PFEW as, according to them ‘experience counts’. Their argument is that this 
development diversifies the skills and experience in the service, buttressed by the 
commonly held view among serving officers that all recruits should do time ‘on the beat’.  
The squeeze on pay exacerbates workload pressures and poor morale, so as another 
commented ‘a lot of officers are in debt and I’m worried about a return to corruption’. This 
has implications for service standards.  All PFEW interviewees reported police officers 
having to do ‘more for less’, with one explaining, ‘when I started there were four sergeants 
but now there’s one and all their work’s been bumped down to us’. Another noted that 
‘acting sergeants are on the increase but they lack the experience in the role, plus they then 
leave gaps for other police officers’. The general picture that emerged was of pressurised 
police officers on the front line (constables and sergeants) and then gaps as inspectors were 
perceived to have ‘moved away’ from the front line. One commented that ‘the inspector 
hides from issues and for that matter, so does the management’. He went on to explain that 
there were no senior staff around after 5pm, so the work then falls on the sergeant (for 
example handling complaints). Those interviewed reported being overloaded with work – 
they could not ‘get annual leave in’, they were expected to deal with duty changes at short 
notice, and were constantly working late to fill in paperwork or to cope with shortages. 
These pressures have consequences in terms of commitment to the service as was widely 
expressed, ‘I don’t want to leave but the goodwill’s gone’. 
An additional aspect of police work organisation is the creeping privatisation, for example, 
private security companies are taking control of custody suites, traffic offices and highway 
agencies. As one optimistic company head put it: ‘Private companies will be running large 
parts of the UK's police service within five years’ (Guardian 20/6/12). These are very real 
concerns: ‘over the past few years, the police have been thinking the unthinkable. Faced 
with a 20 per cent budget cut courtesy of the coalition’s severe post-financial crisis 
‘comprehensive spending review’, many forces have been toying with the policy of 
privatising front-line services to save money’ (White 2014 at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/five-reasons-why-its-difficult-to-privatise-the-
police/). White’s (2014) published research identifies the five reasons why this policy has 
13 
 
been so difficult to implement: media scaremongering; public fear; lack of support from 
senior officers; inexperience in contracting out; and problems in staffing the contract. 
 
All of these changes in skill mix, recruitment and training have been contested by the PFEW 
but this has proved less problematic for managers than having to deal with an independent 
trade union with full industrial rights.  Some aspects of the changes appear to have triggered 
mixed responses from the PFEW. For example, it was difficult for them to argue against the 
case for better training and promotion opportunities, although they did oppose more direct 
entry to senior ranks and other ‘managerial’ solutions to skill shortages (Neyroud 2011; 
PFEW 2011). 
The division of labour decisions in the police service have therefore been made on the basis 
of externalising key aspects of the policing role to civilian staff who are cheaper, and the 
substitution of cheaper for more expensive staff, broadly in line with Gale’s (2012) findings 
for the UK probation service. This was an imposed change rather than the outcome of a 
negotiated settlement with the PFEW.  
Splitting jobs inside the ambulance service:  
The labour management solution in the case of the ambulance service has been the creation 
of a new internal division of labour including senior paramedics, paramedics, emergency 
care assistants (previously technicians) and ambulance care assistants and drivers who staff 
the Passenger Transport Services (PTS). This new division of labour was created within the 
Agenda for Changevi (AfC) agreement, thereby representing the outcome of extensive 
consultation and negotiation around a detailed job evaluation exercise that underpins the 
NHS job categories. Prior to AfC, the nature of ambulance work was perceived to be 
qualitatively different: ‘a scoop and run service’ which aimed to get the patient to hospital 
as quickly as possible. The scope of ambulance worker involvement at the scene was 
circumscribed since they only required the limited Miller Certificate which provided for little 
engagement in pre-hospital care. AfC effectively triggered a range of training and skills mix 
changes that reconfigured the nature of ambulance work along ‘professional’ lines. 
The job evaluation process enabled ambulance work to be broken down into its constituent 
tasks, and among different categories of workers. PTS relies primarily on driving skills. The 
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allocation of this part of the job to cheaper staff has enabled much of this work to be 
privatised, leaving emergency care assistants and paramedics to deal with medical 
emergencies and call-outs.  There are also essential ‘backroom staff’ in this service, with 
mechanics that make ready the ambulance fleet. The ambulance service was also offered 
the prospect of the acquisition of additional skills through government-funded training with 
the requirement on paramedics to register with the Health Professionals Council (HPC).   
The focus of the paramedic job is with providing essential pre-hospital care. Some 
paramedics undertake additional, advanced training to equip them for lone, rapid response 
work. One such paramedic, also a UNISON representative, explained how she had 
undertaken extensive training to enable her to perform this role, such that she was 
effectively ‘better qualified than some senior nursing staff, but on lower pay’. The detail of 
the job meant that she could be faced with life and death decisions ‘at the scene’ and she 
was expected to act autonomously. As she explained,  
 ‘We have to be autonomous.  We have to make that quick decision there and 
 then.  We don't have the luxury of even picking up a phone and saying, I need  to 
 speak to Dr. Such and Such.  This is what I've got.  What do you think?  We 
 don't have that’. 
This autonomy carries particular pressures associated with working alone and in sometimes 
highly traumatic circumstances. A UNISON representative noted, ‘this is a difficult group to 
work with, because of their regular proximity to trauma’. He observed that in any other 
sphere of work this would attract lots of counselling support but that these workers ‘get on 
with it’. 
 Another UNISON representative commented, their ‘professionalism is now comparable to 
nurses’ and as such there are minimum standards of competence and ‘fitness to practice’. 
While registration with the HPC confers some degree of ‘professional comparability’ it also 
allows for a paramedic to be struck off. Furthermore, there appeared to be a greater 
willingness among senior managers to trigger formal disciplinary measures as they seek to 
avoid ‘bad press’.  
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The dispatching of ambulances to patients is managed by control rooms staffed by 
emergency call handlers. Technology therefore plays an important part in matching 
emergency calls made to the service with the dispatching of an ambulance within prescribed 
target times. As one representative explained, the quality of information from control can 
be variable as the call handling protocol is ‘scripted’. She reflected on ‘getting ‘psyched up’ 
for emergency’ that can sometimes turn out to be the ‘panic of an elderly patient who 
doesn’t want to be on his [sic] own’. The problem is that other emergency situations cannot 
be attended to until the ambulance is formally dispatched. This can act to close down the 
professional discretion of the paramedic who must wait for the call. The technology is also 
being used as a form of surveillance to monitor call times, so as an emergency care 
assistant, also a UNISON representative explained, ‘we’re followed and we’re tracked, we’re 
GPS-tracked, so at every point… every second of every day they know exactly where I am’. 
This has the effect of increasing the intensity of the labour process.  
Demand for the ambulance service has increased since 2006 and the increased workload 
pressure that flows from this is unrelenting (IDS 2014; Mather, 2014). One representative 
noted that ‘calls have doubled – demand has gone through the roof’. He attributed this to 
two main developments: first the emergence of the GP out-of-hours service and the fact 
that people do not like call centres so they call 999 for the ambulance when they cannot 
contact their GP; and second the impact of an increase in TV exposure to the service 
(programmes such as Casualty). As a result, ambulance crews were increasingly complaining 
that calls were ‘coming in that aren’t our responsibility’. Another noted that the failures in 
111 have also triggered major upward demand on Accident and Emergency in general, and 
ambulance services in particular. 
There are no recruitment difficulties in the ambulance service below the level of paramedic, 
but there is a problem with the ability of NHS Trusts to recruit and retain qualified 
paramedic staff (UNISON, 2014). While one UNISON representative commented: ‘it’s now 
seen as a career choice – it’s seen as a professional service’, another representative (also a 
paramedic) explained:  
 ‘It takes three years to get a paramedic through their training now.  … the pressure’s 
 on in all the other trusts, country-wide, to get paramedics who are already qualified.  
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 It's not happening.  There's no quick fix.  And unfortunately, because of getting rid of 
 so many staff, or as people  left … because the job's not as enjoyable as it was, then 
 it's hard for them to get qualified staff in’. 
One consequence of this shortage  is an increased reliance on the lower paid, but less-
qualified emergency care assistants/support workers, so: 
 ‘it's regularly two support workers that turn up on an ambulance… They're 
 qualified to sort of assist a paramedic, but they're not qualified to work 
 autonomously when treating the patients …it’s horrendous, you know.  It's 
 more and more with the lack of paramedics as well…They're into that sort of 
 stage where they have to put unqualified staff on an ambulance’. 
Another made similar observations: 
 ‘We’re short staffed so we’ve got not enough paramedics… But the person 
 that I’m working with there … is an ECSW as well, so they’ve doubled us up, so we do 
 an awful lot of double ECSW  crews. .. Now, then, we’re not qualified and we can’t 
 assess a patient, we’re just there as a support’.  
Evidence from the 2012 NHS Survey raised similar concerns, revealing management-led 
restructuring and workforce reorganisations, whereby ambulances were staffed with one 
paramedic and one driver, instead of a fully qualified (and more expensive) crew. The report 
cited one paramedic who explained that this put both workers under ‘more pressure and 
stress’ as one had to attend to patients while the other had to cope with driving constantly 
in a blue-light situation. The downside risk is clear: ‘patients have less qualified staff 
attending. This is risky if there is more than one patient e.g. in a road traffic accident’ (IDS 
2013:139). 
The emergency care assistant role (replaced the previous technician role, although there are 
still technicians working in this role) attracts less pay and is therefore cheaper, so in many 
respects this mirrors the substitution of cheaper for more expensive staff that is a feature of 
the police division of labour. It is also the case that part of the management solution relies 
on the privatisation of some work that had belonged with the ambulance service – the 
entire PTS is now delivered in the private sector by passenger transport drivers or 
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ambulance care assistants (also known as emergency care support workers). A 
representative explained the more routinized nature of this work: 
 ‘The ambulance care assistants work… primarily patient transport services. 
 Obviously, the training isn’t as in-depth as the likes of paramedic or technician. 
 Obviously, we do get training on things like oxygen therapy and that sort of thing, 
 but mainly it’s more routine. Sometimes urgent jobs but obviously we don’t 
 respond to, like, red calls and things like that, … it’s more routine’. 
Another, (himself an emergency care support worker) elaborated on the boundaries of his 
job: 
 ‘So what the Emergency Care Support Worker does is works with a qualified, 
 either a paramedic or a technician, and my role is to support them …  … I’m not 
 just a driver, some people think ECSWs are just drivers,  but we  have the 
 vehicle, so we check the vehicle in the morning and make sure it’s all  stocked up 
 for the paramedics’. 
The 2012 NHS survey indicates that a third of ambulance staff report always working in 
excess of their contracted hours, and although they were paid overtime for these extra 
hours they were concerned about the negative consequences of this ‘substantial increase in 
their workload (IDS 2013:37). Blaming pressure to meet government targets plus the 
additional duties and responsibilities that now fall within their roles, ambulance staff 
reported low levels of morale, feeling stressed and under-valued by their managers. The 
same report highlights a related development in workforce reorganisation in what amounts 
to  a departure from job profiles in AfC bands, whereby service managers down-band some 
ambulance workers’ jobs so workers do the same jobs but on lower pay. The managerial 
solution to cost cutting pressures in the ambulance service therefore appears to have rested 
on a newly devised internal division of labour that is the outcome of a joint agreement 
between the relevant unions and service managers. One consequence appears to be the 
more intensive use of labour working in this part of the emergency services. 
 
 
18 
 
Plus ca change in the fire service: 
Solutions to the labour problem in the fire service have surfaced rather differently. The 
potential for creating a new division of labour through the breaking down of the firefighter 
role is not feasible – there is no scope for externalising parts of the job to other, less-
qualified workers. This is where an understanding of the real nature of ‘emergency work’ 
becomes clearer and more significant. In a genuine emergency all firefighters have to be 
comfortable operating within the command and control environment that characterises a 
999 fire situation. It is simply too dangerous to have in place sub-categories of workers who 
are part-qualified to deal only with parts of the job.  
Analysis of resourcing decisions reveals a division of labour based on whole-time and 
retained duty firefighters, although these arrangements tend to be confined to shire, rather 
than metropolitan brigades. For example, in one shire service, the staff mix is based on a 
40:60 whole-time to retained ratio. The attraction of using retained firefighters is the 
potential cost saving – they earn 10% of whole time salary plus payments to attend training 
and incidents. There is growing pressure, notably triggered by the Knight Review (2013) for 
managers to increase reliance on these on-call firefighters as they are cheaper, the 
implication being that they would displace some of the more expensive whole time staff. 
This represents the more intensive use of both categories of worker. This is in the context of 
job losses which amount to a 9% reduction (5000) in the number of firefighters since 2010 
(FBU, 2014). While these job losses have been delivered primarily through a policy of non-
replacement of staff, an FBU representative pointed out that this still meant ‘a loss of 
firefighters in real terms, no matter how you cut it’. 
The whole-time/retained duty mix is also important for a range of other reasons – the need 
for sufficient crewing levels; coverage and response times, and minimum number crewing 
levels. This is particularly evident in rural fire stations which tend to be staffed by retained 
or ‘on-call’ firefighters where there are recruitment difficulties and where it takes longer for 
on-call workers to get to the fire station and mobilise (FBU 2013). While retained firefighters 
therefore offer managers a degree of flexibility in resourcing decisions, the downside is the 
labour turnover problem among this group of workers. As one FBU representative 
explained,  
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 ‘Turnover in the retained is really high. Some people just don’t hack it because it 
 asks a lot of people to give up, or to ask employers to give up people to fight 
 fires in their local area. And people give up their own time and families in the 
 middle of the night. It asks a lot for very little reward and they’re  very poorly paid 
 for what they do’.  
This indicates some constraints on labour management decisions with regard to extending 
reliance on retained crews. The balance between retained and full time fire-fighters may 
vary although in reality many retained firefighters are involved in highly specialized tasks 
and they are all ‘competent’ to deal with fire and rescue incidents. However this masks 
important variations in access to training – retained firefighters are paid to undertake two 
hours training per week to maintain operational competence, whereas whole time 
firefighters work forty-two hours per week and much emphasis is placed on training during 
these hours. FBU representatives emphasised the crucially important role of training in 
order to keep up to date with firefighting skills and the use of an increasingly complex array 
of equipment. The costs of training and the importance of public safety and the perception 
of public safety means that externalising such tasks and jobs therefore remains on 
management wish-lists only. Importantly, any skill differences between whole-time and 
retained are not seen by the public or indeed the service managers. For example specialist 
response can be provided by retained stations in the areas of flood response and water 
rescue.   
While 999 response is an important aspect of the firefighter’s job a major emphasis across 
the service is the increasing focus on fire and accident prevention work. This means that 
firefighters are expected to engage in community-based initiatives such as fitting smoke 
alarms and talking to community groups. Uniformed firefighters are perceived to add 
credibility to the prevention message and whole-time firefighters undertake this as part of 
their whole-time duties. The retained duty workforce is by its nature far more limited in its 
availability to undertake such work. There has been an associated reduction in the number 
of fires since 2010, so according to Sir Ken Knight, ‘in the case of fire and rescue services 
there remains a significant decrease in demand for its operational response …. Differences 
in operational practices, including minimum crewing levels and the ratio of senior managers 
to firefighters further show that there are savings to be made without reducing the quality 
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of outcomes for the public’ (2013:4/5). But this is disputed by the FBU: ‘The improving 
statistics show that the fire and rescue service is more productive than it has ever been in 
the past’ (FBU 2013:4). Matt Wrack, FBU General Secretary argues against reducing the risk 
of fire to market forces supply and demand style arguments – ‘It takes the same number of 
firefighters and fire engines to safely and efficiently extinguish a house fire whether a town 
has ten house fires per week or one per month. Fire and rescue service ‘supply’ cannot 
simply be scaled up or down in response to ‘demand’ (FBU 2013:3). He goes on to explain 
that the public expect an effective, timely response in the event of an emergency and this 
cannot be delivered with reduced fire service capability. This argument draws out the 
potentially dangerous nature of the job that cannot be hived off to another category of 
worker. As one FBU representative put it, ‘you only need one fire’.  
There is more use being made of technology in the fire service but firefighters do not regard 
this as a threat to their jobs. More training to use technological innovations is seen to 
enhance the skill content of the job and so ‘our jobs are safe’. However innovations in fire 
appliances, rapid deployment requirements and moves to reduce minimum crew sizes 
create major pressures for those on the front line. This is a major point of contestation for 
FBU representatives. One explained, ‘We used to ride with five and now it can be down to 
three’. He linked this to firefighter safety concerns and noted that managers would not be 
able to go further without compromising firefighter safety.  
A related development was the move towards co-responding, with firefighters being asked 
to undertake emergency first aid work. For firefighters, the view is that ‘it is not in the 
interests of the public to displace the ambulance service, nor to believe that firefighters can 
provide a medical service on the cheap’ (FBU 2013:17). When interviewed, one FBU 
representative explained that he had been ‘on a job’ the previous week, and was ‘relieved 
when the paramedic arrived’ because ‘he’s the expert, not me’. He went on to comment in 
detail about the boundaries, as he saw them, between a firefighter’s job and those of a 
paramedic, noting that he was not a qualified medical person, ‘but the paramedic wouldn’t 
be expected to rush into the burning building, would he? Nor would he cut the roof off in an 
RTA (road traffic accident)’. 
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One development that emerged in the interviews was a reported increase in the use of 
disciplinary measures. An FBU representative noted an increasing willingness on the part of 
managers to widen the scope of disciplinary matters to encompass issues arising outside of 
the workplace under the general heading of ‘bringing the service into disrepute’. He cited 
examples of where disciplinary action had been triggered at times on the basis of very 
limited evidence. He also mentioned that the ‘fear factor’ was part of the problem: the fire 
service had become fearful of ‘bad press’, underlining the importance of maintaining public 
‘confidence’. 
As part of the broader picture there is an ongoing national industrial dispute over 
firefighters’ pensions. The attack on firefighters’ pensions is deeply felt by firefighters and 
adds to their sense of ‘being betrayed’. An FBU regional official noted that ‘it’s a bit like 
being in a boxing match – like being punched into submission’. He went on to explain that 
firefighters ‘put their lives on the line’, but they felt under-valued and demonised. He 
suggested that this sense of betrayal provided a focal point around which firefighters could 
be galvanised to resist management and ministerial pressures to further reduce costs.  
Some fire authorities, as part of the business continuity case, are contemplating the use of 
‘volunteer’ civilians and private security companies to provide emergency cover in the event 
of continued strikes. The fire authorities are obliged by the government to provide the 
service. The problem for the government is that this service is highly unionised and the FBU 
is seen to present major obstacle to reforming the way the fire service is delivered. As 
Knight notes, ‘The Grey Book can lead to some self-limitation by leaders not to introduce 
change that would require lengthy negotiation. It should be reviewed’ (2013:8).  
All of this suggests that despite increasing ministerial and management pressures, there is 
limited scope for further division of labour in the fire service over the short term. The 
reasons for this relate partly to the nature of the labour process itself as there is no obvious 
scope for externalising parts of the job to other, less-qualified workers. Even the non-
emergency prevention activities still necessitate the involvement of firefighters if this work 
is to have credibility and impact in the wider community.  
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Conclusions 
The main political imperative that drives management strategies across the English 
emergency services is to cut costs while at the same time protecting, or being seen to 
protect standards and ‘reach’ of service provision. The political consequences of any 
mistakes are significant.  Our research highlights that the underlying thrust of management 
strategies relies on the mantra of doing the same (or more) with less in these labour 
intensive services. This translates into work intensification as spending is cut but with the 
work still to be done.  
The common downward budgetary pressures have therefore been tackled in a different way 
in each of the three services through careful attention to labour process changes, viewed 
here through task allocation and skill mix changes and how these processes may be 
understood to impact on the ‘professional’ labour process of those working on the 
emergency service front line .  The ‘civilianisation’ programme has been intensified in the 
police service and although contested, has gathered pace in the absence of an independent 
trade union with full industrial rights. It was possible through close analysis of the police 
task for managers to identify those parts of the job that could be hived off and allocated to 
cheaper PCSOs, ‘freeing up’ over-worked warranted officers to focus on the core policing 
task. In the ambulance service the increased division of labour accepted after Agenda for 
Change has been further developed through staff cuts. There are limits to this as paramedics 
are quitting and proving increasingly difficult to replace. Staff shortages are being managed 
by the use of cheaper, less-qualified ambulance staff. In fire the status quo ante prevails but 
with increasing pressures for skill changes. Our findings suggest the scope to enact skill mix 
changes is significantly restricted by a complex mix of factors that present a major barrier to 
management-led reforms: the highly unionised nature of the workforce the nature of the 
task itself and in particular the need for all firefighters to be able to deal with emergencies 
in a command and control environment; public and firefighter safety arguments; and high 
training costs. 
One aspect of the research as presented here was to highlight how workers’ representatives 
viewed these new pressures to solve the long-standing labour problem. In so doing we have 
drawn on Braverman’s analysis while also reflecting on mediating factors such as ‘risk’, the 
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available technology, and the modern-day application of Taylor’s management control 
through increased division of labour. However, in line with Vidal (2007), our findings suggest 
that different managerial solutions are emerging in each of the three emergency services as 
management decision-making is mediated by a complex dialectic of a range of factors that 
play out rather differently in each service.  
In conclusion, this paper fills in a knowledge gap and allows emergency services to be 
discussed within a framework of a new division of labour settlement that substitutes more 
management, more technology, and more outsourced work for traditional service 
standards. This, we argue, risks both the further alienation of front line staff and the 
provision of a variable and more selective service to the public.   
Notes: 
                                                          
i
 In October 2010 the government spending review stated that budgets would be reduced by 20% for police; 
25% for local government; 7.5% for fire services; and approximately 20% for the ambulance service. 
ii
  Fire Brigades Union is a closed occupational union with about 44,000 members; UNISON, GMB, and UNITE 
are all open general unions with members in the ambulance service; Police Federation of England and Wales is 
a statutory based post-entry closed shop for police officers below the rank of Superintendent and has about 
130,000 members;
 
 Public and Commercial Services Union is a general union mainly recruiting civil servants. 
PCSOs belong to UNISON, and the PCS in London. 
iii
 Firefighters’ pension dispute: there have been 48 periods of industrial action as between 2012-2014 by the 
FBU on this issue. See FBU circular 0032MW, January 2015. 
iv
 Police civilians voted to strike over pay in December 2014 but this was called off in January 2015 after the 
employers improved their offer from 1% to 2.2%. There was a mass demonstration of 30,000 police officers in 
London in May 2012 over the threat of 20% cuts, and another march in 2013 over the Winsor report on police 
pay. 
v
 Ambulance staff belonging to all three unions voted to strike over changes to sick pay arrangements and over 
pay offers at the end of 2014. 
vi
 Agenda for Change is the generic NHS pay system introduced in 2004 and loosely based on forms of job 
evaluation. 
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